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Summary. We examine the properties of a two country dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model that
allows for preferences to be non-homothetic. We show that the model has a continuum of steady
state equilibria under free trade, with the initial conditions determining which equilibrium will be
attained. We establish conditions under which a static Heckscher-Ohlin theorem will hold in the
steady state, and also conditions for a dynamic H-O theorem to hold. If both goods are normal, each
country will have a unique autarkic steady state, and all steady state equilibria are saddle points.
We also consider the case in which one good is inferior, and show that this can lead to multiple
autarkic steady states, violations of the static H-O theorem in the steady state. Furthermore, there
may exist steady state equilibria that Pareto dominate other steady states. These steady states will
be unstable if discount factors are the same in each country, although they may exhibit dynamic
indeterminacy if discount factors di¤er.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the role of tastes in determining the steady state capital stocks, the pattern
of trade and the local dynamic properties of steady state equilibria in a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin
(H-O) model of international trade. It is frequently assumed in dynamic versions of the H-O model
that countries have identical and homothetic preferences with a constant intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (CIES), which has the e¤ect of making the world demand for goods independent
of the distribution of wealth across countries. While these assumptions about preferences simplify
the analysis of steady states and transitional dynamics, they are not consistent with the empirical
evidence. The assumption of homotheticity of preferences is suspect because studies of consumer
demand have found signicant departures from unit income elasticity of demand for some goods,
even when considering highly aggregated categories of goods. For example, wealthy countries tend
to have lower budget shares for food and higher budget shares for services than poor countries.
In addition, there is evidence that the level of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES)
varies systematically with the level of wealth.1 In light of the relatively poor performance of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model in explaining trade patterns, it is of interest to know the extent to which
taste di¤erences across countries may account for these results by inuencing the patterns of trade
and capital accumulation.
To address the role of taste di¤erences across countries on the predictions of the H-O model, we
examine a model of household demand that allows for di¤erences in demands across countries based
on the level of per capita wealth. Specically, we assume that preferences are identical and additively
separable across countries at the (innitely lived) household level, but we allow preferences to be
non-homothetic and/or to have an IES that varies with the level of consumption.2 As a result of this
assumption, di¤erences in labor productivity or di¤erences in the capital/labor ratio across countries
may lead to di¤erences in marginal propensities to consume and/or the IES across countries. In
order to highlight the role of tastes, we maintain the H-O assumption that production technologies
are identical across countries (when labor is measured in e¢ ciency units). We then examine how
1Houthakker and Taylor [12] study a panel of US households nd that the share of income spent on food declines
and the share spent on services rises with household income. Hunter [14] estimated a linear expenditure system for
11 product categories across 34 countries, and found that departures from homotheticity have a signicant impact
on trade volumes. Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart [21] use macroeconomic data from a cross section of low and middle
income countries to show that the IES rises with the level of wealth. In the same vein, Ogaki and Atkeson [20] nd
evidence of di¤erences in the IES with the level of household wealth using Indian household data. However, they do
not nd evidence of di¤erences in the rate of time preference with the level of wealth.
2Most of the existing literature on taste di¤erences has focused on di¤erences in rates of time preference across
countries. Stiglitz [25] analyzed the case with innitely lived consumers and showed that the patient country will
export the capital intensive good in the steady state. The assumption of di¤erent rates of time preference means that
countries will have di¤erent autarkic steady states, and that at least one country will specialize in production in the
steady state. We allow for di¤erences in rates of time preference, but maintain incomplete specialization in the steady
state by limiting attention to the case in which the sum of the rates of depreciation and time preference is equal across
countries.
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departures from the assumption of homothetic preferences and CIES a¤ect the pattern of trade and
the dynamics in the neighborhood of the steady state.
The benchmark model with homothetic preferences and CIES, versions of which have been stud-
ied by Chen [7] and Ventura [27], yields three main results regarding comparative advantage and
the pattern of trade that we focus on.34 The rst is that there is a continuum of steady state
capital stocks for the two countries consistent with a free trade equilibrium for the world economy.
Each of these potential steady states is a saddle point characterized by factor price equalization (in
e¢ ciency units) and incomplete specialization in production, and each yields the same world capital
stock. Which of these steady state distributions of capital the economy converges to is determined
by the initial distribution of capital across countries, so that initial positions for the countries will
have permanent e¤ects on their capital labor ratios.5 We show that the model with taste di¤erences
also has a continuum of steady state equilibria, and each of these equilibria will be a saddle point
as long as goods are normal in consumption. Thus, the dependence of the steady state on initial
conditions persists in the model with taste di¤erences. However, the world capital stock will vary
across steady states when intratemporal preferences are not homothetic because the steady state
income distribution will a¤ect world demands. In particular, we show that if the labor intensive
good is a necessity in consumption, the world capital stock will be larger the greater is the di¤erence
in per capita incomes across countries.
The second feature of the benchmark model is that a steady state H-O theorem holds, in the
sense that the country that is capital abundant in the steady state will export the capital intensive
good. We show that this result continues to hold if there are no labor productivity di¤erences
across countries and the discount factor is common. However, the steady state H-O theorem could
be violated if there are labor productivity di¤erences across countries. This possibility arises if
the income elasticity of demand for the labor intensive good is greater (less) than one and the
high productivity countrys capital/labor ratio is su¢ ciently close to the autarky level from above
(below). Violations can also occur when the rate of time preference di¤ers across countries. The
third result of the benchmark model is that the country that is relatively capital abundant at the
initial position will be relatively capital abundant in the steady state, and will export the capital
intensive good on the path to the steady state. This represents a form of dynamic H-O theorem, in
3Chen obtained the results on trade patterns discussed here in a two sector model with endogenous labor supply.
Ventura obtained similar results in a model that could exhibit either a steady state or endogenous growth, depending
on the parameters of the production technology. His focus was on the implications of the model for convergence in
per capita incomes.
4Bond et al. [5] analyze a Heckscher-Ohlin model in which there is accumulation of both capital and labor
(through accumulation of human capital). They establish existence of a balanced growth path for the world economy,
but show that the accumulation paths of individual countries are indeterminate because households are indi¤erent
between physical and human capital accumulation at the margin. Doi et al. [10] extends their model by introducing
adjustment costs in human capital accumulation (see also Hu et al. [13]).
5The continuum of steady states plays a prominent role in the model of Atkeson and Kehoe [1], where countries
that start the development process later will converge to a lower capital labor ratio than countries that develop earlier.
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that the future trade patterns are predicted from the initial relative factor endowments. We show
that this result continues to hold with taste di¤erences if labor productivity and the discount factor
are both common across countries. However, the result could fail when if labor productivities or
rates of time preference di¤er across countries.
Labor productivity di¤erences are easily incorporated into the production side of the H-O model,
since labor inputs can be measured in standardized e¢ ciency units. Free trade and incomplete
specialization will then result in the equalization of factor prices in e¢ ciency units, which allows
wage rate for labor to be higher in high productivity countries. Treer [26] shows that adjustments
for productivity di¤erences using market wage rates improves the predictive power of the H-O model.
On the demand side, labor productivity di¤erences have no e¤ect in the benchmark model, since
the distribution of world income does not a¤ect demand. Our results on trade patterns, however,
show that labor productivity di¤erences can lead to a reversal of H-O predictions when tastes are
not homothetic because of their e¤ect on per capita wealth.
Our analysis concludes by considering the case where one of the goods is inferior. We show that
there may exist multiple autarkic steady states, and that some of the free trade steady state may
be Pareto dominated. The condition for the steady states to be a saddle point will be satised as
long as the e¤ect of inferiority is not too large. In the case where discount rates are the same across
countries, the steady state equilibrium must be either a source or a saddle point. However, there
is a possibility of dynamic indeterminacy in the case where discount rates di¤er across countries.6
The possibility of dynamic indeterminacy in a two country trade model typically arises due to the
existence of a distortion in markets or due to market incompleteness (e.g. Nishimura and Shimomura
[18] for the case of factor-generated externalities in a two country dynamic H-O model and Galor [11]
for the overlapping generations version of the dynamic H-O model).7 The factor price equalization
property of the dynamic H-O model ensures that markets are complete when the discount rates are
equal across countries, and thus that indeterminacy will not arise, because there are no additional
gains that can be realized from allowing international lending and borrowing.
2 The Dynamic Two-Country Heckscher-Ohlin Model
In this section we formulate the continuous-time version dynamic optimization problem for a repre-
sentative country in a dynamic H-O model. By dynamic H-O model, we mean that each country has
access to the same technology for producing two goods using a xed factor (labor) and a reproducible
6With normality in consumption, capital accumulation would lead to a reduction in the rental on capital, which
yields the saddle-point stability of steady states. Suppose that a labor intensive good is inferior. Then, the more
capital countries accumulate, the less labor intensive good is demanded, and hence the more capital is needed for
producing goods. So, there is a possibility of the non-monotonic relation between capital stock and its rental rate and
the model will exhibit rich dynamic properties.
7See Benhabib and Farmer [2], [3], and Benhabib and Nishimura [4] for indeterminacy in a closed model and
Nishimura and Shimomura [17] for a small open economy.
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factor (capital) under conditions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Good 1 is a
pure consumption good, and the second good is a consumable capital good. Factors of production
are assumed to be mobile between sectors within a country, but immobile internationally, and there
are no markets for international borrowing and lending. We refer to the representative country as
the home country: the corresponding behavioral relations for the other (foreign) country will be
denoted by a .
We assume that the home (foreign) country is made up of H (H) households, with each house-
hold having an endowment of labor, l, and a concave utility function u dened over consumption of
goods 1 and 2, c1 and c2. We assume that the physical quantity of labor per household is common
across countries, but allow for the possibility that labor productivities di¤er across countries. We
assume that a unit of labor in the home country represents   1 e¢ ciency units of labor, with
the productivity of foreign labor normalized to 1. The restriction that the labor endowment per
household and the household utility function are common across countries denes a sense in which
each country has the same preferences, although the household preferences are not necessarily homo-
thetic. It also means that we can distinguish between variations in the scale of the economy, which
changes the number of households but keeps wealth per household constant, and variations in the
wealth of a household. This distinction is useful in the case where preferences are not homothetic.
2.1 The Production Side
As to technologies, we will assume that
Assumption 1: The production function in each sector is quasi-concave and linearly homoge-
neous. Pure consumption good 1 is labor intensive.
Letting w denote the wage rate on an e¢ ciency unit of labor and r the rental on capital, the tech-
nology in sector i can be characterized by the unit cost function i(w; r), i = 1; 2. The competitive
prot conditions require that
p  1(w; r); (1)
1  2(w; r); (2)
where good 2 is chosen as numeraire. The aggregate stocks of labor is denoted by L, and provides
L e¢ ciency units of labor. The stock of capital is denoted by K, so we will refer to K=(L), as the
e¤ective capital labor ratio or simply capital labor ratio. Factor market equilibrium requires that












where vi is the fraction of labor devoted to sector i and i(w=r) = ir(w; r)=iw(w; r).
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Solving for w and r when (1) and (2) hold with equality, we obtain the factor prices (w(p); r(p))
that are consistent with production of both goods. These factor prices will satisfy full employment
for K=(L) 2 [1(w=r); 2(w=r)]. We will make assumptions below regarding tastes and discount
factors and depreciation rates that will ensure that any steady state equilibrium must involve a price
consistent with incomplete specialization in each country. Since our analysis will focus on properties
of the steady state and the behavior in the neighborhood of the steady state, we will limit our
presentation of the production side to the case of incomplete specialization.
With incomplete specialization, we can express GNP as w(p)L+ r(p)K. Our assumption that
households have identical labor endowments implies that L = Hl. It will further be assumed that
the initial endowment of capital is equally distributed across households, so we can denote the initial
per household stock of capital by k0 = K0=H. This will imply identical holdings of capital across
households at each point in time, k = K=H, which makes it convenient to express the production
side on a per household basis. Applying the envelope theorem, we obtain the per household output
of good i, yi to be
y1(p; k; l) = w
0(p)l + r0(p)k; y2(p; k; l) = [w(p)  pw0(p)]l + [r(p)  pr0(p)]k: (5)
The supply functions are linear in k and l with incomplete specialization, where r0(p) < 0 and
pw0(p)  w(p) > 0 since good 1 is labor intensive.
2.2 The Consumption Side
We analyze the optimization problem for a representative household that owns l units of labor under
the assumption that the initial endowment of capital of a household is k0 = K0=H. We will impose
the following restrictions on this utility function:
Assumption 2: The utility function is concave, with u11 < 0 and D  u11u22   u12u21 > 0 for
any (c1; c2) 2 f(c1; c2) 2 R2+jui(c1; c2) > 0, i = 1; 2g.






subject to its ow budget constraint
w(p)l + r(p)k = pc1 + c2 + _k + k; k0 given, (7)
where  is the rate of depreciation on home country capital and  is the home country discount
rate. The budget constraint reects the assumed absence of an international capital market, since
it requires that pz1 + z2 = 0, where z1 = c1   y1 (z2 = c2 + _k+ k  y2) is the per household excess
demand for good 1 (2).
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Solving the current value Hamiltonian for this problem yields the necessary conditions for the
choice of consumption levels, the di¤erential equation describing the evolution of the costate variable,
, and the transversality conditions:
u1(c1; c2) = p; u2(c1; c2) = ; (8)
_ = [+    r(p)]; (9)
lim
t!1k(t)(t)e
 t = 0: (10)
It will be useful for the subsequent analysis to invert the necessary conditions for choice of
consumption levels to obtain consumption relations ci(p; ) for i = 1; 2 and an expenditure relation
E(p; )  pc1(p; ) + c2(p; ). The following Lemma, which is proven in the Appendix, establishes
some properties of these functions.
Lemma 1 (i) c1 = pc1p + c2p. (ii) E = pc1 + c2 < 0. (iii) c1p < 0. (iv) Ep = c1 + c1.
Our expenditure relation di¤ers from the standard expenditure function in that it holds constant
the marginal utility of income, rather than the level of utility. Good i is normal if ci < 0, so
(ii) establishes that goods must be normal in total. We will use homothetic to refer to the case
in which the consumption relations satisfy @[c1(p; )=c2(p; )]=@ = 0, so that the intratemporal
preferences have indi¤erence curves that are homothetic. In the homothetic case,  E(p; )=E(p; )
will equal the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.8 In particular, with CIES equal to &, we have
E(p; ) = e(p) & .
Using (7), (9), and the expenditure function, we can express _k and _ as functions of (k; ; p) :
_k = w (p)l + r (p) k   E(p; )  k; (11)
_ = [+    r(p)]: (12)
In the case of autarky, the system is closed by adding the market clearing condition for good 1 at
home,
z1(p; k; l; )  c1(p; )  y1(p; k; l) = 0: (13)
Equations (11), (12), and (13) govern the evolution of (k; ; p) under autarky.
8The  constant expenditure function has the property that E(p; VI(p; I)) = I, where V (:) is the indirect utility
function. Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to I yields E=E = VI=(IVII). With homothetic preferences,
V (p; I) = ~u(I=~e(p)), where u(c1; c2) = ~u(C(c1; c2)), C(c1; c2) is homogeneous of degree one, and ~e(p) = min pc1 + c2
subject to C  1. This yields  VI=(IVII) =  ~u0(C)=(C~u00(C)), which is the IES.
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2.3 The Foreign Country and World Market Equilibrium
The optimization problem for a foreign household is analogous to that for the home country. The
technologies of the two countries are assumed to be the same, so w(p) = w(p) and r(p) = r(p)
for k=(l) 2 [1(w(p)=r(p)); 2(w(p)=r(p))]. Note that this equalization of factor prices in the two
countries at a given price involves an equalization of wage rates in e¢ ciency units, so that wage rates
per unit labor will di¤er if labor productivities di¤er. We choose units of labor such that  = 1,
so  will represent the wage of a unit of home country labor relative to foreign country labor when
wage rates are equalized in e¢ ciency units. Since household utility functions are the same across
countries, we have ci (:) = ci(:) and E
(:) = E(:). Substituting these relations into the solution of
the foreign countrys household optimization problem yields
_k = w (p) l + r (p) k   E(p; )  k; (14)
_ = [ +    r(p)]: (15)
The foreign autarkic equilibrium can be described by (14), (15), and z1(p; k; l; ) = 0.
In a free trade equilibrium, the price of good 1 will be equalized across countries and will be
determined by the world market clearing condition for good 1,
Hz1(p; k; l; ) +H
z1(p; k; l; ) = 0: (16)
The free trade equilibrium can be solved for the evolution of (k; k; ; ; p) using (11), (12), (14),
(15), and (16). In our analysis of the free trade equilibrium, we will assume that
Assumption 3:   +  =  + ;   .
This condition ensures that _= = _= at each point in time as long as the conditions for factor
price equalization are satised. This will result in  = m for some m > 0 along the optimal path,
which simplies the analysis by reducing the dimensionality of the system.
In the case where  = , the solution to the competitive equilibrium will also be Pareto optimal
because free trade equates both the marginal rates of substitution between goods at a point and
the marginal rate of substitution between goods at di¤erent points in time in this case. Therefore,
opening international capital markets is unnecessary if discount factors are equal. A similar point
applies to the possibility of labor mobility if the home labor productivity factor is embodied in units
of home labor, because the equalization of the wage rate in e¢ ciency units across countries would
eliminate any incentive for labor to move. On the other hand, if  > , the home country households
are more impatient and have less of a desire to accumulate capital, but the home country is a better
location to place capital (because  < ). In this case the real return to capital di¤ers across
countries under equalization of capital rentals, since r(p)    > r(p)   . Without international
capital markets, therefore, this solution is not Pareto optimal. Indeed, there will exist additional
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gains from opening international capital markets to allow foreign households to own capital located
in the home country.9
3 World Market Equilibrium
We begin our analysis of the world market equilibrium by deriving conditions for the existence of a
steady state equilibrium price, and showing that this price is the only one consistent with a steady
state equilibrium under autarky or free trade. We then derive the steady state relationship between
the marginal utility of income and excess demand for good 1, which can be used to characterize the
steady state trade patterns and determine the conditions under which the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem
holds. We conclude by analyzing the dynamics of the world equilibrium in the neighborhood of the
steady state, and establishing conditions under which the initially capital abundant country in terms
of e¤ective capital labor ratio remains capital abundant along the path to the steady state.
We rst establish su¢ cient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a steady state price at
which _k = _k = _ = _ = 0. Condition (12) requires that r =  in order to have _ = 0, and
Assumption 3 ensures that this will also yield _ = 0. In order for this to be consistent with
incomplete specialization, the competitive prot conditions (1) and (2) must hold with equality
when r = . So, we assume that10
Assumption 4: inffrj2(w; r) = 1g <  < supfrj2(w; r) = 1g.
Then, (2) can be inverted to obtain a unique steady state wage rate ~w() that is consistent with
competitive production of good 2. Competitive production of good 1 will require a price ~p() =
1( ~w(); ). This will be the only possible price consistent with a steady state when technologies are
the same in all countries, since there would be no production of good 1 (2) with r =  for p < ~p()
(p > ~p()). This steady state relative factor price, ~w()=, will determine a unique capital labor ratio
employed in production in sector i in the steady state, i( ~w()=). Letting ~min()  1( ~w()=)
and ~max()  2( ~w()=), full employment will require that k=(l); k=l 2 [~min(); ~max()].
9A similar point applies to the case of labor mobility if the productivity factor for labor is determined by the
country in which labor is located. If  > 1, all labor is more productive if located in the home country, so that
e¢ ciency is achieved by locating all labor and capital at home (assuming  = ). This would happen immediately
if both labor and capital are internationally mobile. If labor is mobile internationally but capital is not, this would
happen asymptotically as capital in the foreign country is allowed to depreciate without replacement.
10The right hand inequality would fail in the case of a xed coe¢ cients production function in sector 2 where the
output per unit capital is less than . In that case the productivity of capital is too low to justify replacement and the
existing stock of capital would be allowed to depreciate. The left hand inequality could fail if the marginal product of
capital in sector 2 has a lower bound exceeding , as could arise with a CES production function where the elasticity
of substitution exceeds 1.
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Lemma 2 Let Assumption 4 hold. Then, there will exist a unique steady state wage, ~w(), and
price, ~p(), consistent with a steady state equilibrium with incomplete specialization.
The household budget constraint (11) requires that the per household steady state capital stock
satisfy11




if _k = 0. Equation (17) illustrates a negative relationship between the steady state values of 
and k. Higher levels of the capital stock are associated with higher income and expenditure, which
requires a lower marginal utility of income. Since ~k(; l; ) < 0, we can invert (17) to dene a
range of feasible steady state values of , (l; ) = (~min(l; ); ~max(l; )), where ~min and ~max
are dened as the solutions to ~k(; l; )=(l) = ~max and ~k(; l; )=(l) = ~min, respectively.12
Substituting (17) into the per household excess demand for good 1, we obtain a steady state (per
household) excess demand function
~z1(; l; ) = c1(~p; )  y1(~p; ~k(; l; ); l): (18)
The autarkic steady state equilibrium is obtained by solving ~z1(; l; ) = 0. Since good 1 is labor
intensive, y1(~p; ~k(~min; l; ); l) = 0 and y1(~p; ~k(~max; l; ); l) = [E(~p; ~max) + ~k(~max; l; )]=~p.
The former implies that ~z1(~min; l; ) = c1(~p; ~min) > 0 and the latter that ~z1(~max; l; ) =
 [c2(~p; ~max) + ~k(~max; l; )]=~p < 0, which ensures the existence of a steady state equilibrium.13
To establish conditions for the uniqueness of the autarkic steady state equilibrium, we di¤eren-
tiate (18) with respect to  and use (5) to obtain




which is negative when good 1 is normal, since good 1 is labor intensive (r0 < 0). With the assumption
of normality in consumption, therefore, the equilibrium will be unique. In the rest of this section
except for subsection 3.2 on equilibrium dynamics, we will assume that
11 In order to simplify the presentation, we suppress the dependence of steady state values on , which is xed, in
the following discussion.
12 In the following, we suppress l and  as arguments of ~min and ~max when there is no ambiguity.
13Ventura [27] utilizes a model in which there are two traded intermediate goods (one produced using labor only,
the other using capital only) that are combined to produce a non-traded nal good. The nal good can be either
consumed or used as a capital good, and preferences have a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Although
the structure is slightly di¤erent from the one assumed here, it generates a steady state excess demand with properties
virtually identical to those derived here. Letting the nal good be chosen as numeraire and assuming good 1 is the
labor intensive intermediate, we have E(1; ) =  & and ~k(; l; ) = ( &   ~wl)=. Letting (w; r) denote the unit
cost function for the nal good, we have s1 = l and d1 = w( ~w; ) & , where s1 and d1 are the supply and demand
for intermediate good 1 ( = 0 is assumed), respectively.
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Assumption 5: Both goods are normal at all levels of income.
Figure 1 illustrates the steady state per household excess demand function. If  =  and  = 1,
the foreign excess demand function will coincide with that of the home country and the autarkic
steady states for the two countries will exhibit the same prices and the same marginal utility of
income. To see the e¤ect of di¤erences in the rate of time preference (holding  +  constant) and












l < 0: (20)
Since ~k(; l; ) is decreasing in  from (17), an increase in  results in an excess supply of labor
intensive good 1 at a given . This is illustrated by the downward shift of ~z1 in Figure 1, resulting in
a lower autarkic value of : Similarly, an increase in  will create an excess supply of good 1 because
it reduces the steady state capital stock and raises the e¤ective labor supply in each household.
The e¤ect of parameter changes on the steady state capital stocks is obtained by total di¤eren-












[~pw0(~p)  ~w]c1 + w0(~p)c2
~z1
l > 0: (21)
The increase in  has two e¤ects on the autarkic steady state capital stock kA. One is a direct
negative e¤ect that leads to a lower capital stock at a given level of household income, @~k=@ < 0;
and the other a positive e¤ect due to rising household income ((@~k=@)(@A=@) > 0). The negative
e¤ect dominates the positive one. Similarly, an increase in  will lower household demand for capital
at a given income level, @~k=@ < 0; but also have a positive income e¤ect on demand for capital
((@~k=@)(@A=@) > 0). In this case the income e¤ect dominates, leading to higher per household
capital holdings in the country with higher labor productivity. Since both the e¤ective labor supply
and the supply of capital per household are larger in the home country, it remains to determine
whether the autarkic steady state capital labor ratio is higher in the more productive country.











(1  L) 1E   r0(~p)ky1
; (22)
where L  ~wl=E is the share of labor income in expenditure and 1E  (c1=E)(E=c1) is the
income elasticity of demand for good 1. Since r0(p) < 0; it follows that (@kA=@)(=kA) > 1 i¤
1E < 1. If preferences are homothetic, then the increased productivity of labor is matched by a
proportional increase in capital, leaving the capital/labor ratio una¤ected. If the income elasticity
of labor intensive good 1 is greater than 1, then increased household income will raise the relative
demand for good 1 and reduce the autarkic capital labor ratio.
These results can be summarized as
11
Proposition 1 (a) There is unique autarkic steady state values (A; kA) for the home country
satisfying ~z1(A; l; ) = 0 and kA = ~k(A; l; ). The foreign country will have the same autarkic
steady state price as the home country. If  =  and  = 1, the home and foreign countries will
also have the same autarkic capital stocks and utility levels.
(b) If  >  and  = 1, the home country will have a higher autarkic utility level and a lower
per household capital stock than the foreign country.
(c) If  > 1 and  = , the autarkic levels of utility and capital per household will be higher in
the home country. The capital/labor ratio will be higher in the home country i¤ the income elasticity
of demand for the labor intensive good is less than one.
3.1 Free Trade Steady States with Normal Goods
A steady state equilibrium with trade exists for any values of  and  at which the world market
for good 1 clears,
Z(; ; l)  H~z1(; l; ) +H~z1(; l; ) = 0: (23)
It follows from Proposition 1 that (A; A) is a solution to (23), and that these solutions are in
the interior of the respective regions. Since the excess demand functions are continuous, it follows
that there will be a continuum of pairs (; ) satisfying (23). If goods are normal, these pairs
must satisfy d=djdZ=0 =  [H~z1(; l; )]=[H~z1(; l; )] < 0. Since there is a one to one
relationship between k and  from (17), the following Proposition holds.14
Proposition 2 There is a continuum of per household capital stocks (k; k) consistent with a steady
state equilibrium. These steady states can be described by a continuous function '(k) dened on a
non-empty interval, where the pair of per household capital stocks (k; '(k)) is a steady state equilib-
rium and














35 < 0: (24)
The world capital stock is the same across all of the steady states if preferences are homothetic and
 = . If the marginal propensity to consume good 1 is increasing (decreasing) in  and  = ,
'00(k) > (<) 0.
When preferences are homothetic and  =  (hence  = ), the bracketed expression equals 1
and the world capital stock is constant in all of the trading equilibria. This is due to the fact that
a transfer of capital from one country to another has no e¤ect on world outputs as long as both
countries remain incompletely specialized. This transfer will also leave world demand una¤ected if
tastes are identical and homothetic and  = , so the world stock of capital is constant across all
14Hereafter, we attach * to the values of functions for foreign country when we omit their arguments, e.g. ~z1
denotes ~z1(; l; ).
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of the potential steady states for the world economy. This is the result obtained by Chen [7] and
Ventura [27]. However, if good 1 is a necessity (i.e. the income elasticity of good 1 is less than one),
the marginal propensity to consume good 1, ~pc1=E, will be increasing in . Since an increase in
k in the steady state is associated with a lower value of  and a higher value of , the bracketed
expression in (24) will be decreasing in k when good 1 is a necessity. This yields '00(k) > 0, as
illustrated in Figure 2 (curve (i)), so that a transfer of income from the poor country to the rich
country will reduce demand for (labor intensive) good 1. As a result, the world capital stock will be
higher the greater the di¤erence in income between the two countries. This e¤ect is reversed when
good 1 is a luxury good, and the world capital stock is smaller the greater the di¤erence in income
between the countries (curve (ii) in Figure 2).
The following result on steady state trade patterns can be established using Figure 1.
Proposition 3 If  =  and  = 1, then the steady state trade pattern must satisfy the static H-O
theorem. The static H-O theorem will also hold if  > 1 and preferences are homothetic. However,
if  >  or  > 1 and preferences are not homothetic, there will exist some steady states for which
the static H-O theorem is violated.
A violation of the H-O theorem requires that the importer of labor intensive good 1 be the capital
scarce country, which requires sgn(z1) = sgn(k k=). If  =  and  = 1, then the home country
will import the labor intensive good i¤ it has the higher per capita income in the steady state (i.e.
sgn(z1) = sgn(
   )). However, we have from (17) that the the home country will have a higher
capital stock in this case i¤  > . Therefore, the H-O theorem must always hold in the steady
state.
If  > , on the other hand, it is possible to observe violations of the H-O theorem in the steady
state trade pattern. Consider the case where  = 1 >  = 0 in Figure 1. At the autarkic states
for each country we have A < A from (20), so there will exist steady state equilibria with trade
where  < A < A <  and ~z1 > 0 > ~z1 hold. Note that (21) implies that k
A < kA holds since
good 1 is labor intensive. Therefore, there will exist " > 0 such that a steady state equilibrium with
 = A   " satises kA < k < k < kA and ~z1 > 0 > ~z1 . For free trade equilibria satisfying these
conditions, the capital abundant foreign country will export the labor intensive good. A similar
possibility arises when  > 1 and preferences are not homothetic. Higher labor productivity in the
home country is also associated with A < A as illustrated in Figure 1. From (22), we have kA= <
(>) kA if 1E > (<) 1. It is then possible to construct trading equilibria where the steady state
value of  is smaller (larger) but su¢ ciently close to A and the capital abundant foreign (home)
country will be exporting labor intensive good 1.
It is well known from static trade models that the H-O theorem may not hold if countries have a
taste bias toward the good that uses their abundant factor intensively. Thus, it might be surprising
that the H-O theorem must always hold in the steady state when  = 1. This result is due to the
fact that taste di¤erences between countries are associated with di¤erences in per capita incomes
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in our model. Di¤erences in per capita income must arise from di¤erences in capital stock in the
steady state when  = 1, and the resulting di¤erences in demand for the capital intensive good in
the richer country must be small relative to the di¤erences in output of the capital intensive good
when goods are normal. When  > 1, on the other hand, violations of the H-O theorem can arise
because di¤erences in per capita income can be large even though di¤erences in e¤ective capital
stocks per household are small.
3.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
The equilibrium path of (p; ; ; k; k) is described by (11), (12), (14), (15), and (16). In this section
we show how the system can be reduced to a 3 equation system in (k; k; ) and then analyze the
dynamics of this system in the neighborhood of the steady state.
We can rst simplify the dynamic system by noting that as long as the countrys relative factor
supplies are consistent with incomplete specialization, factor price equalization will imply  = m.
We then use the world market clearing condition (16) to solve for p(k; k; ). We can invert (16)
because z1p; z1p < 0 follows from Lemma 1 (iii) and the concavity of the production function. This



















The rst comparative static result in (25) shows that an increase in , which is equivalent to a
decrease in utility in each country (with  = m), will reduce the price of good 1 if it is a normal
good in world demand. The second result shows that an increment of capital has the same impact on
the relative price of good 1 regardless of where it is located as a result of the factor price equalization
property, and will raise the relative price.
Using these results, the system of di¤erential equations can be expressed as
_k = w (p(k; k; ))l + r (p(k; k; )) k   E(p(k; k; ); )  k; (26)
_k = w (p(k; k; )) l + r (p(k; k; )) k   E(p(k; k; );m)  k; (27)
_ = [+    r(p(k; k; ))]: (28)
We will use this system to analyze the trade and capital accumulation on the equilibrium path, and
to derive results on the dynamics in the neighborhood of the steady state equilibria.
We evaluate the elements of a Jacobian of the dynamical system (equations (26)-(28)), given
m; to study the local dynamics around the stationary state. Di¤erentiating this system and using
the comparative statics results from (25), we obtain the Jacobian J for the dynamic system and the
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characteristic equation,












































, which is positive from (25) and reects the fact that an increase in capital re-
duces the world return to capital by lowering the relative price of the capital intensive good. Dening
J (x)   det [xI   J ], it is shown in the Appendix that we can use the world market equilibrium






@k = 0 to obtain

























This characteristic equation can be used to derive the local dynamics of the system in the neighbor-
hood of a steady state trading equilibrium.
We begin with the following Lemma, which establishes conditions for determining the number
of negative roots.
Lemma 3 If J(0) is positive, then the characteristic equation has one negative root. On the other
hand, if J(0) is negative, then the equation has two roots with negative real parts when J(+ ) is
negative, and it has no roots with negative real parts otherwise.
Proof. J(x) can be rewritten as
J(x) =  x3    (+ )x2 + J 0(0)x+ J(0):
Applying Rouths (1905) theorem, the number of the roots of J(x) = 0 with positive real parts
equals the number of changes in signs in the following sequence:
 ;    (+ ); J 0(0) + J(0)
(+ )
; J(0):
Let J(0) > 0. Then the number of changes is two irrespective of the sign of the third term and the
characteristic equation has one negative root. Let J(0) < 0. Note that the sign of the third term is
equal to the sign of J(+ ), since J(+ ) = J 0(0)(+ ) + J(0). Therefore, if J(+ ) < 0,
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the number of changes is one and the equation has two roots with negative real parts. On the other
hand, if J(+ ) > 0, the number is three and it has no roots with negative real parts.
Lemma 3 establishes that a steady state equilibrium will be a saddle point if J(0) > 0, which
yields the following result using (30) and (19).
Proposition 4 A free trade steady state equilibrium is a saddle point.














1) < 0 by the normality
assumption.
3.3 Capital Accumulation and Trade on the Optimal Path
The analysis of the steady state trade pattern examined whether the country that is capital abundant
in the steady state would export the capital intensive good. An alternative approach to the question
of comparative advantage is to ask whether the country that is capital abundant at an arbitrary
point in time will export the capital intensive good along the optimal path and/or in the steady
state.
Proposition 5 Assume  =  and factor price equalization holds along the optimal path with
r(p(t)) > . If either (i)  = 1 or (ii) preferences are homothetic with CIES, then the country that
has the higher capital labor ratio at t = 0 will have the higher capital labor ratio and will export the
capital intensive good for t > 0.
Proof. Suppose k0= < k0 . The analysis of the characteristic equation established that the
optimal path converges to the steady state when goods are normal, and the assumption that r(p) > 
will hold for initial conditions su¢ ciently close to the steady state (since r(p) = +  in the steady
state). Dene m to be the relative foreign marginal utility of income at which the steady state
capital/labor ratios are equal, which from (17) requires that E(~p; )= = E(~p; m). Clearly m = 1
if  = 1 and m = 1=& for the CIES case. We rst show that k0= < k0 requires m < m under
the hypothesis of the proposition. Suppose that m  m, which from the denition of m means that
the steady state capital labor ratio at home is greater than or equal to that in foreign at the steady
state. Using (26) and (27) we obtain
_k=  _k = [r(p)  ](k=  k) + [E(p;m)  E(p; )=] + (  )k: (31)
With m  m, we have E(p;m)  E(p; )  0 if  = 1 or E(p;m)  E(p; )= = e(p) (m) & [1 
(m= m)
&
]  0 for the CIES case. Since k0= < k0 and  = , it follows that _k(t)= < _k(t) and
k(t)= < k(t) for either of these cases, which contradicts ~k(; l; )=  ~k(m; l; ). Thus, m < m
holds if k0= < k0 and  = 
. Now suppose that there is a time t0 2 (0;1) at which k(t0)=  k(t0).
Then, _k(t0)= > _k(t0), and hence for all t > t0, we have _k(t)= > _k(t) and k(t)= > k(t) from
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(31), which contradicts with ~k(; l; )= < ~k(m; l; ). Therefore, if k0= < k0 and  = 
, then
k(t)= < k(t) for all t > 0 and m < m, the latter of which implies E(p; )= < E(p;m).
To establish the trade pattern along the path, note that the foreign country will import labor
intensive good 1 at time t  0 if z1(p; k; l; ) < 0 < z1(p; k; l;m). Foreign importing of good 1
will also imply z1(p; k; l; )= < z1(p; k; l;m), or
c1(p; )=  c1(p;m) < y1(p; k=; l)  y1(p; k; l): (32)
Notice that E(p; )= < E(p;m) implies that the left hand side of (32) is negative if  = 1 or
preferences are homothetic, while the right hand side is positive since good 1 is labor intensive and
k(t)= < k(t) along the path.
In order for a capital scarce home country to leapfrog the foreign country and be capital abundant
in the steady state, it must accumulate capital more rapidly than the foreign country on the path to
the steady state. Since the initially capital scarce country has lower income if  =  and r(p(t)) > ,
more rapid accumulation of capital requires a lower expenditure level in the home country than the
foreign country. However, this possibility is ruled out by the conditions of the Proposition, which
ensure that if the home country is capital abundant in the steady state it must spend more per
e¢ ciency unit of labor in the steady state and on the path to the steady state.
The possibility of more rapid accumulation of capital by the capital scarce country could arise in
the homothetic case if the IES varies with  and p, because it leads to the possibility that E= E
changes sign on the path to the steady state. Similarly, initial capital abundance might be consistent
with a lower steady state utility if  > , because initial capital abundance might not imply its
higher current income and/or sgn(E= E) is not necessarily equal to sgn(k= k) at the steady
state.
4 An Example with Inferior Goods
The assumption that goods are normal for all levels of expenditure played a key role in establishing
both the existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium. The proof of existence relied on
being able to invert (17) to obtain 0 < ~min < ~max <1, which may not be possible if preferences
exhibit either a satiation level or a minimum subsistence level. A second role of the normality
assumption is to ensure the monotonicity of the steady state excess demand functions in (19), which
guaranteed that the steady state equilibrium is unique. If the steady state excess demands are
non-monotonic, we have the possibility that there are multiple autarkic steady states, and that the
relationship '(k) identifying possible foreign country capital stocks is a correspondence. Finally,
the monotonicity of the excess demand functions guaranteed that the steady state equilibrium is a
saddle point.
In this section, we illustrate how the results of Propositions 1-5 may be altered by consider-
ing a specic functional form for the utility function that allows for satiation and inferiority in
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consumption.





1     c1c2; for (c1; c2) 2 R
2
+; (33)
where parameters satisfy the following restrictions ; ; ;  and  > 0 and  > 1.
The parameter restrictions ensure that the utility function is strictly concave for all (c1; c2) for
which ui(c1; c2) > 0 for i = 1; 2. The following Lemma establishes that this utility function exhibits
satiation at nite consumption levels, and that good 1 is inferior in the neighborhood of the satiation
point.15
Lemma 4 The utility function (33) yields unique solutions ci(p; ) to (8) for any positive p and .
These solutions have the following properties:
(i) For any p > 0; lim!0 c1(p; ) = c1 and lim!0 c2(p; ) = c2; while lim!1 ci(p; ) = 0; i =













(ii) If c2=c1 > ~p, then there is some 0 > 0 such that c1(~p; ) is positive (negative) when  is
smaller (greater) than 0, while c2(~p; ) is always negative.
It can be seen from (19) that in order for the excess demand function to be non-monotonic in ,
labor intensive good 1 must be inferior and its inferiority must be su¢ ciently large.
In the rest of paper, we assume, for simplicity,
Assumption 6:  = 1.
From (5) and (17), the excess demand function (18) can be written as follows:
~z1(; l; ) =  r




1()  ~p  
r0(~p)




Since this utility function exhibits a satiation level of consumption, k(l; ) = lim!0 ~k(; l; )
is nite and decreasing in l (see Figure 3). Note that l  (~pc1 + c2)=(~max + ~w) is a solution to
k(l; )=l = ~max. If l > l, then ~max > k(l; )=l. It implies that the satiation level is reached before
the capital labor ratio at which specialization in the capital intensive good occurs. Therefore, the set
15For more details see the Appendix and Iwasa and Shimomura [15]. The utility function used in Doi et al. [9] is a
special case of the one in (33).
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of feasible steady state values of  is restricted by the possibility of satiation, (l; ) = (0; ~max(l; )).
So, we redene ~min and ~max as follows:
~min(l; ) = minf  0j~k(; l; )=l  ~maxg and ~max(l; ) = maxf  0j~k(; l; )=l  ~ming:
In order for the steady state excess demand to be non-monotonic, 1()c1(~p; )+ c2(~p; ) must
change sign on (l; ). It follows from Lemma 4 that if c2=c1 > ~p, the steady state excess demand
for good 1 must be decreasing in  for   0. The following Lemma (proven in the Appendix)
establishes a set of parameter values for the preferences under which there will be a critical value
^() < 0 such that the excess demand function ~z1(; l; ) dened in (34) is increasing (decreasing)
in  for  < (>)^().










Lemma 5 If Assumptions 5and 7 hold, ~z1(; l; ) is strictly concave in  for  2 [0; 0] and there
exists a critical value ^() 2 (0; 0) such that ~z1(; l; ) is increasing (decreasing) in  for  < (>)
^().
The rst inequality in (35) ensures that the excess demand function is strictly concave in 
for  2 [0; 0], while the second is required for ~z1(0; l; ) > 0. Taken together, these restrictions
imply the existence of ^(). The fact that the steady state excess demand function is increasing
(decreasing) for  values less (greater) than the critical value leads to the possibility of two autarkic
steady state equilibria. Since excess demand is linearly decreasing in l, there will exist a value l1
satisfying ~z1(^(); l; ) = 0 and a value l0 such that lim!0 ~z1(; l; ) = 0. Figure 4 shows how the
excess demand functions shift downward with increases in l. For l 2 (l0; l1), there will be two steady
state equilibria, denoted by L(l) and H(l) with L(l) < H(l), while there will be a unique autarkic
steady state equilibrium when l < l0 (see Figure 4). Notice that for all l 2 (l0; l1), ~min(l; ) = 0
and ~max(l; ) > ^() hold, and hence L(l); H(l) 2 (l; ).16
Proposition 6 For l 2 (l0; l1), there will be two autarkic steady state equilibria and for l > l1 there
will exist no autarkic steady state equilibria.
The failure of an autarkic steady state equilibrium to exist results from the fact that when l is
su¢ ciently high, the output of the labor intensive good per household is so high that it exceeds the
demand for all values of k at which households are not satiated.
16See the Appendix.
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4.1 Steady State Equilibria with Trade
We now turn to a characterization of the steady state capital stocks and trade patterns that are
consistent with a free trade equilibrium when Assumptions 5, 6, and 7 are satised.
Let
A(l)  (; ) 2 R2+jZ(; ; l)  0	 :
Then, given l, the set of steady state pairs, (; ), lies on the boundary of A(l). Lemma 5 ensures
that, given l > 0,
Z; Z < 0 for (; ) 2 B 

(; ) 2 R2+j;   0
	
and Z = 0;
that is, the function Z is strictly concave in (; ) on B and achieves its maximum at (; ) =
(^(); ^()).
First, we consider the symmetric case ( =  and H = H). Since the foreign excess demand
function coincides with that of the home country when  = , the free trade equilibria can be found
as in Figure 4. For l 2 (l0;l1), the pairs, (; ) = (L(l); L(l)), (H(l); L(l)), (L(l); H(l)), and
(H(l); H(l)), are all autarkic free trade equilibria, and hence there will be a continuum of free
trade equilibria. Figure 5 illustrates the set of equilibrium pairs. It is the solid locus for l = l0,
the dashed locus for l = l^  (l0 + l1)=2, and the point, (; ) = (^(); ^()) for l = l1. Notice
that for l 2 (l0; l^), the positively sloped curve intersects the horizontal or vertical axis, because
~z1(0; l; ) + ~z1(^(); l; ) > 0 holds for such l values.
Corresponding to the slopes of the excess demand functions of the respective countries at the
free trade steady state, we dene three types of steady state pairs in the following.
Type (i) (; ) with ~z1 and ~z1 > 0 (i.e.  < ^() and 
 < ^());
Type (ii) (; ) with ~z1~z1 < 0 (i.e.  > ^() and 
 < ^(), or  < ^() and  > ^());
Type (iii) (; ) with ~z1 and ~z1 < 0 (i.e.  > ^() and 
 > ^()),
where (; ) 2 (l; ) (l; ).
The type (iii) equilibria have basically similar properties to those with normality assumption in
Section 3. However, type (i) and (ii) equilibria may have di¤erent properties from type (iii) equilibria.
The pair T and T in Figures 4 and 5 represent a type (i) equilibrium.17 Note that the H-O
theorem must be violated at this equilibrium (as it must be at any type (i) equilibrium when  = ),
since the country with the larger capital stock (i.e. lower marginal utility of income) will be exporting
the labor intensive good. This occurs because the richer country demands less of the inferior labor
17Since d=djdZ=0 =  H~z1=H~z1, the boundary of A(l) is negatively sloped for type (i) and type (iii) equilibria,
and positively sloped for type (ii) equilibria.
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intensive good, and this e¤ect dominates its relatively lower supply of the labor intensive good at
these equilibria. The pair (T 0; T) in Figures 4 and 5 is an example of a type (ii) equilibrium.
Note that the H-O theorem is also violated in this equilibrium, although it is not necessarily violated
at all type (ii) equilibria (e.g. the type (ii) equilibrium in which the home country is at T ).18





1) < 0. This condition is satised for type (iii) equilibria, but must clearly fail for type (i)
equilibria. In contrast, type (ii) equilibria with  < ^() ( > ^()) will be saddle-point stable








> = = m if ~z1 > 0;
< = = m if ~z1 < 0:
(36)
Point S in Figure 5 is one example of type (ii) equilibrium where (36) holds.




1) > 0 (J(0) < 0), Lemma 3 shows that the local dynamics
will be determined by the sign of J( + ). Evaluating this expression at  =  using (30), we
obtain J(2) = 2 3 J(0) > 0, which implies that a steady state is a source when it is not a saddle
point and discount rates are identical.19
Based on the above, we obtain the following Proposition, which shows that the H-O theorem will
be violated at some steady states with the saddle-point stability, even if discount rates are identical.
Proposition 7 Let  =  and H = H hold. For l 2 (l0; l^], there exist type (ii) equilibria where
the H-O theorem is violated while the saddle-point stability holds.
Proof. Let m0(l)  L(l)=H(l), which is positive for l 2 (l0; l1). Since the positively sloped
curve intersects the horizontal axis for l 2 (l0; l^], there is at least one intersection between the curve
and the ray from the origin  = m with m < m0(l) where (36) holds (e.g. point S in Figure 5).
Since  2 (^(); H(l)) and  2 (0; L(l)) holds here, ~k < ~k and ~z1 > 0 > ~z1 are satised, that is,
the capital abundant foreign exports labor intensive good 1 at the equilibrium: the H-O theorem is
violated.
In the rest of this section, we shall consider the asymmetric case with  > . And we redene
l0 and l1 as20
lim
;!0
Z(; ; l0) = 0 and Z(^(); ^(); l1) = 0 (37)
18 It can be easily shown that when  =  the H-O theorem holds if and only if the steady state value of  or 
is greater than H(l).
19This is consistent with ndings of Kehoe et al [16], who have shown that dynamic indeterminacy cannot arise
in a one sector growth model with a nite number of innitely lived agents and complete markets. If  = , the
equilibrium under factor price equalization will result in a Pareto optimal allocation in the H-O model even without
the existence of markets for borrowing and lending.
20 If  = , these values correspond to the previous ones, which is associated with the existence of two autarkic
steady states in Proposition 6.
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Suppose that for l 2 (l0; l1),
k(l; )=l < ~max and ~max(l; ) > ^() (38)
and
Z(~max; m^~max; l) < 0; (39)
where m^  ^()=^(). Then, we have21
~min(l; ) = ~min(l; 
) = 0 and ^() < ^() < ~max(l; ) < ~max(l; ) for l 2 (l0; l1): (40)
If the ray from the origin cuts twice the boundary of A(l) on (l; )(l; ), then one of them
is type (i) or type (ii) equilibrium with J(0) < 0, while the other is type (iii) or type (ii) equilibrium
with J(0) > 0. The following Proposition shows the existence of such two intersections for some
range of values of m.
Proposition 8 Let the di¤erence between  and  be such that (38) and (39) hold. For l 2
(l0; l1), there exists an open interval M(l) such that for any m 2 M(l), Z(;m; l) = 0 has exactly
two solutions for  one of which corresponds to type (i) equilibrium and the other does type (iii)
equilibrium.
Proof. Consider Z(; ; l) along the ray  = m^ which passes through (^(); ^()). Z is
increasing in  on [0; ^()) and decreasing in  on (^();1). Note that for l 2 (l0;l1), Z(0; 0; l) < 0
and Z(^(); ^(); l) > 0 from (37) and Z(~max; m^~max; l) < 0 from (39), where ^() < ~max and
m^~max < ~

max hold from (40). Therefore, along the ray 
 = m^, Z changes its sign twice as
 increases from 0 to ~max, which implies that  = m^ cuts twice the boundary of A(l) and
one intersection corresponds to type (i) equilibrium and the other does type (iii) equilibrium (see
Figure 5). So, for each l 2 (l0;l1), we can nd an open interval M(l) that includes m^ such that
for any m 2 M(l), Z(;m; l) = 0 has exactly two solutions for  one of which satises (;m) 2
(0; ^()) (0; ^()) and the other does (;m) 2 (^(); ~max) (^(); ~max).
In the case Z(;m; l) = 0 has two solutions for , say L and H (L < H), the steady state
with (; ) = (L;mL) Pareto dominates the other equilibrium, as it involves a higher level of
utility for both countries. In the next section, we will show that the Pareto dominant steady state
(type (i) equilibrium) that is unstable with  =  can become stable if  6= .




Indeterminacy has been shown to arise in H-O models when markets are incomplete, as in Galor [11]
for the case of overlapping generations of nitely lived consumers. In an H-O model with innitely
lived consumers, Nishimura and Shimomura [19] have shown that indeterminacy can arise when
 6=  if preferences are quadratic and there is a negative income e¤ect.22 The possibility of inde-
terminacy arises with  6=  because factor price equalization does not give rise to a Pareto optimal
allocation without international markets for lending. We conclude by showing that indeterminacy
can arise if  6= , preferences are given by (33), and technologies take the following specication.23
Assumption 8: i(w; r), i = 1; 2, are given by aiw + bir, where ai and bi are constant and
nonnegative with a1b2   a2b1 > 0 and b2 <  1.
Notice that a1b2   a2b1 > 0 implies that good 1 is labor intensive (Assumption 1) and b2 <  1
corresponds to Assumption 4.
The next Lemma, which is proven in the Appendix, will be used in the proof of indeterminacy
in Proposition 9.
Lemma 6 Let Assumptions 5 and 8 hold. Then, we obtain (i) lim!0 ~z1(; l; ) < 1 and
lim!0 ~z1(; l; ) <1; (ii) lim;!0   = 0.
Proposition 9 Let the di¤erence between  and  be such that (38) and (39) hold. If l 2 (l0; l1)
is su¢ ciently close to l0, then for any m 2 M(l), the dynamical system (equations (26)-(28))
has exactly two stationary solutions each of which is consistent with incomplete specialization and
indeterminacy occurs around one of the steady state, while the other is saddle-point stable.
Proof. From Proposition 8, for any l 2 (l0; l1), there are exactly two steady states with m 2
M(l). Let (L; L) and (H ; H) denote the points in (; ) space which correspond to the type
(i) and type (iii) equilibrium, respectively. Then, the steady state with (H ; H) is saddle-point
stable. On the other hand, J(0) is negative at the steady state with (L; L). Let JL( + ) be
the value of J( + ) at the steady state with  = L. The result will be established by showing
that JL(+ ) < 0. From equation (30), we obtain JL(+ ) to be
JL(+ ) =   (+ 
)(  )~z1
r0(~p)










22Bond et al [5] obtain a continuum of equilibrium paths in a model with physical and human capital accumulation
due to the fact that the two types of capital are perfect substitutes from the point of view of households. This
illustrates the importance of having su¢ cient curvature in the problem to generate unique paths, as has been shown
by Shannon and Zame [23].
23 In the case of Leontief technologies, the unit cost functions become linear in w and r as in the following Assumption.
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where r0(~p) is given by  a2=(a1b2 a2b1) under Assumption 8. Note that for anym both L and L
(= mL) go to 0 as l goes to l0. From Lemma 6, the last term in parentheses is bounded, so the last
term will approach 0 as ;  ! 0. Also, we see that the second term will approach 0 as ;  ! 0. For
the rst term, we have liml!l0 ~z1(
L; l; ) < 0, because Z(0; 0; l0) = H~z1(0; l0; )+H~z1(0; l0; ) = 0
and @~z1=@ = r0(~p)~k= < 0 together imply that ~z1(0; l0; ) < 0. Therefore, JL( + ) is negative
when l is su¢ ciently close to l0. Thus, from Lemma 3, the characteristic equation has two roots
with negative real parts at the steady state with  = L, which implies that indeterminacy occurs
around the steady state.
The possibility of dynamic indeterminacy in a two country trade model when there are no markets
for international lending and borrowing has been previously shown Shimomura [24] and Doi et al.
[8] for the case of an endowment model of international trade in which one of the goods is durable
and there is a negative income e¤ect. Nishimura and Shimomura [19] discussed the possibility of
dynamic indeterminacy in a two country H-O model, where they supposed  6=  and a specic
utility function and Leontief technologies with b1 = 0 and a2 = b2 = 1, and derived some conditions
under which indeterminacy occurs around the steady state. However, their focus is mainly on
the occurrence of indeterminacy and they did not considered the multiplicity of the steady states
in our model. Indeed, one can verify that in their model, there is no possibility of multiplicity
because the negatively sloped region in their excess demand function is inconsistent with incomplete
specialization under their assumed preferences and technologies.24
Bond and Driskill [6] have shown that inferiority in consumption is not necessary to generate
multiple steady states and indeterminacy in the model with durable consumption goods: indetermi-
nacy can arise when both goods are normal as long as the exporting country has the higher marginal
propensity to consume a good. In contrast, our results here show that inferiority in consumption
is a necessary condition for the existence of multiple steady states and indeterminacy in the H-O
model when factor price equalization holds. The di¤erence between the two cases is due to the
fact that with the factor price equalization property, the marginal utility of consumption in the two
24 In Nishimura and Shimomura [19], there are errors in their equation (57), the value of l0, and the steady state
values of k; k; y1, and y1 with l = l0, though this does not change the main result they obtained. Equation (57)
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Solving the equation above, we obtain the correct form of (l), k(l), and k(l) in their paper. The value of l0 is
the solution to (l) = 0. And hence, the values of other stationary state variables, k(l0), y1(l0), k(l0), and y1(l0)
(equations (61), (62), (64a), and (64b) in their paper) are obtained. Also Theorem 4 in their paper should be restated
as follows: Let Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 5 hold. Then, given m > 0; there are  (m) < 1 and l (m) > l0 such that for
any  2 ( (m) ; 1) and any l 2 (l0; l (m)) the characteristic equation (55) has two roots with negative real parts, that
is, an equilibrium path near the stationary state (k (l) ; k (l)) is indeterminate.
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countries must be moving in the same direction along the optimal path. The H-O model of trade
we examine here also requires that trade balance at each point in time. However, if there is factor
price equalization along the optimal path, international lending and borrowing is redundant if the
discount factors of the two countries are the same. As a result, a di¤erence in discount factors
between countries and inferiority in consumption are both necessary conditions for indeterminacy
to occur.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has focused on the question of how the results of the dynamic H-O model will extend
to the case in which preferences are non-homothetic, so that demands of households vary with per
capita wealth. We have shown that if labor productivities and discount factors are the same across
countries and goods are normal in consumption, then the main results of the benchmark H-O model
will hold. These results include the fact that the steady state trade pattern will satisfy the static
H-O theorem, a dynamic H-O theorem will hold, and the free trade steady state will be a saddle
point. The primary di¤erence introduced in this case is that the world capital stock in the steady
state will depend on the distribution of income across countries.
The case with identical labor productivities is one in which the only di¤erences in per capita
income are due to di¤erences in capital accumulation. Allowing labor productivities to vary intro-
duces the possibility that the steady state and dynamic H-O theorems fail to hold. In the case of
the steady state H-O theorem, violations can occur if preferences are not homothetic because the
autarkic steady states vary across countries. In the case of the dynamic H-O theorem, homotheticity
is not su¢ cient to establish that the initially capital abundant country will export the capital inten-
sive good at all points in time. Thus, di¤erences in labor productivities play a role on the demand
side when demands di¤er with the level of per capita wealth.
We have also provided an example to show that the results may di¤er dramatically if the labor
intensive good is inferior. These di¤erences include the possibility that there are multiple steady
state equilibria, that the static H-O theorem is violated in the steady state, and that some steady
state equilibria are Pareto dominated. If discount factors are the same across countries, steady state
equilibria will be either saddle points or unstable equilibria. However, if discount factors di¤er across
countries there is the possibility of local indeterminacy.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1


















Since the determinant of the coe¢ cient matrix, D = u11u22   u212, is positive at any point where
ui(c1; c2) > 0 (Assumption 2) and therefore invertible, we obtain











(u11   u12p); (42)





u22 < 0; (43)





The results of Lemma 1 follow immediately from these comparative statics results.jj
6.2 Derivation of the Characteristic Equation (30)
Expanding (29) yields
det [xI   J ] = x3  

























































Since Hz1 +Hz1 = 0 at the world trade equilibrium and r
0 @p






@k = 0 from (25),
the coe¢ cient of x2 becomes   (+ ). Using the latter equation to substitute into the coe¢ cient
on x and the constant term yields
  






















and using (19) yields (30) in the text.
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6.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Let   f(c1; c2) 2 R2+j0 < c1 c2 <  and 0 < c1c2 < g, which is the set of (c1;c2) for which
ui(c1; c2) > 0 for i = 1; 2. It is straightforward to show that (33) is strictly concave over the subset
 when Assumption 5 is satised. The proof that the solutions to (8) are unique proceeds in
two steps, which will only be sketched here. First, establish that any element of  has a unique













for 0 < s;  < 1. Second, substitute this
representation into (8) and show that the resulting equations have unique solutions s(p; ); (p; ) 2
(0; 1) for any positive p and . Furthermore, these solutions have the properties that the respective
function are decreasing in  with lim!0 s(p; ) = 1, lim!1 s(p; ) = 0, lim!0 v(p; ) = 1, and
lim!1 v(p; ) = 0. Based on these two results, we can conclude that for any positive p and , the















(i) From equations (46) and (47), it is clear that lim!0 c1(p; ) = c1 and lim!0 c2(p; ) = c2,
since lim!0 s(p; ) = 1 and lim!0 v(p; ) = 1. On the other hand, from the rst-order conditions
(equations (8)), we see that lim!1 ci(p; ) = 0; i = 1; 2.




[ c  12 ~p+ ]; c2(~p; ) =
1
D
[ c  11 + ~p]; (48)






2 > 0: (49)
Since c2=c1 > ~p,  >  (c2)  1 ~p, we have c1(~p; 0) > 0. Lemma 1 (ii) then implies c2(~p; 0) < 0.
Indeed, one can verify that
 >  (c2)
  1
~p
)  (c1)  1 > ~p: (50)
Since c1(~p; ) > 0 , c2 > (~p=)1=(+1) and lim!1 c2(p; ) = 0, a su¢ cient condition for
the existence of a 0 such that c1(~p; ) > (<) 0 for  < (>) 0 is that c2(~p; ) < 0 for all .
Suppose that c2(~p; 0)  0 holds for some 0. We then have c1(~p; 0) < 0 from Lemma 1 (ii). Since
c1(~p; 0) > 0, the continuity of c1 in  ensures there is some 00 < 0 such that c1(~p; 00) = 0. We
also have c1(~p; 00) > c1(~p; 0) because c1 < 0 on (00; 0), which means c2(~p; 00) > 0 due to the
fact that the numerator of c2 in (48) is increasing in c1. However, c1(~p; 00) = 0 and c2(~p; 00) > 0
contradicts Lemma 1 (ii). Therefore, c2(~p; ) < 0 for all .jj
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6.4 Proof of Lemma 5
In order to establish the result, we rst prove the following:
Lemma A1 : Suppose that  > ~p. If  >  r0(~p)(2   ~p2)=~p, then 1()c1(~p; ) + c2(~p; ) is
negative for   0.






















Using the denition of D in (49), D is positive since s; v < 0 as established in the proof of
Lemma 4. It then follows that c1 is negative and c2 is positive for  2 [0; 0], because c1  0
and c2 < 0 in this interval as established in Lemma 4. Notice that c1(~p; )  c1 and c2(~p; )  c2














for   0. Based on the above, we obtain




























































for   0. Here the second inequality comes from (52), the third equality is due to (51), and the
last inequality comes from (50) and (52).
From Lemma A1, we see that the excess demand function (34) is strictly concave in  for
 2 [0; 0].
Next, it is apparent from (48) that
1()[    (c2)  1 ~p] >  (c1)  1   ~p ) 1()c1(~p; 0) + c2(~p; 0) > 0:
One can easily verify that the former inequality is identical to inequality  >  r0(~p)(2   2~p +
~p2)=(   ~p) under  > ~p.
Therefore, ~z1 < 0 for  2 [0; 0] and ~z1(0; l; ) > 0 if Assumptions 5and 7 hold. Since both
c1 and c2 are negative for  > 0, it is apparent from the continuity of ci; i = 1; 2, in  that
there is some ^() < 0 such that
~z1(; l; ) =  r
0(~p) [1()c1(~p; ) + c2(~p; )]

(
> 0; if  < ^();
< 0; if  > ^();
(53)
where ^() is implicitly dened as the solution to ~z1(; l; ) = 0.jj
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6.5 The ranges of feasible steady state values of  and 
We rst show that if  = , then for all l 2 (l0; l1), ~min(l; ) = 0 and ~max(l; ) > ^() hold, and
hence L(l); H(l) 2 (l; ).
Since l is the solution to ~max = k(l; )=l with k(l; ) = [E(~p; 0)   ~wl]=, ~min(l; ) = 0 and
~z1(0; l; ) = c1 > 0 from the arguments below (18). Since ~z1(0; l0; ) = 0, we have l0 > l, which
implies k(l0; )=l0 < ~max. So, for l 2 (l0; l1), k(l; )=l < ~max, i.e., ~min(l; ) = 0. It is clear from
~z1(^(); l1; ) = 0 that for l  l1, ~z1(^(); l; )  0, and hence ~max(l; ) > ^().
So, as long as the di¤erence between  and  is small, we have for l 2 (l0; l1),
k(l; )=l < ~max and ~max(l; ) > maxf^(); ^()g;
where
k(l; ) < k(l; ) and ~max(l; ) < ~max(l; )
hold, since k(l; ) = [E(~p; 0)  ~wl]= and ~max(l; ) are decreasing in  from Figure 3. Notice that
k(l; )=l < k(l; )=l < ~max
means ~min(l; ) = ~min(l; ) = 0 for l 2 (l0; l1).
Also, we see that if the di¤erence is small,
Z(~max; m^~max; l) < 0;
where m^ = ^()=^(), because Z(~max; ~max; l) < 0 from the arguments below (18).
Thus, (38) and (39) hold as long as the di¤erence is small.
Next, we show that  >  implies
^() > ^():
From (34), we obtain
~z1(; l; ) =  r
0(~p)

E(~p; ) + c1(~p; ):















It is clear from Lemmas 1 and 5 that the numerator on the right-hand side of the equation above is
positive, while the denominator is negative, i.e. @^=@ > 0.
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6.6 Proof of Lemma 6
From (13), (19), and (41)-(43), we obtain







u22~p  u12   r0u22~p








u11u22   (u12)2 :
Notice that @y1=@p = 0 under Assumption 8. Since lim!0 ci(p; ) = ci 2 (0;1), i = 1; 2, we see
lim
!0
~z1(; l; ) <1 and lim
!0
z1p(~p; k; l; ) = 0:
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